Abstract-Measurement of software reliability by life testing involves executing the software on large numbers of test cases and recording the results. The number of failures observed is used to bound the failure probability even if the number of failures observed is zero. Typical analyses assume that all failures that occur are observed, but, in practice, failures occur without being observed. In this paper, we examine the effect of imperfect error detection, i.e., the situation in which a failure of the software may not be observed. If a conventional analysis associated with life testing is used, the confidence in the bound on the failure probability is optimistic. Our results show that imperfect error detection does not necessarily limit the ability of life testing to bound the probability of failure to the very low values required in critical systems. However, we show that the confidence level associated with a bound on failure probability cannot necessarily be made as high as desired, unless very strong assumptions are made about the error detection mechanism. Such assumptions are unlikely to be met in praetice, and so life testing is likely to be useful only for situations in which very high confidence levels are not required.
I. INTRODUCTION N important step in the development of many computing
A systems is some form of reliability assessment. In some cases, it is essential to have confidence that the system achieves a required level of reliability before it is put into service. It might be necessary, for example, to demonstrate that a safetycritical system achieves the level of reliability prescribed by a regulatory agency (e.g., [41) .
Reliability can either be estimated directly by using observed behavior or be predicted indirectly by using analytic models. Estimation can be achieved by a process known as life testing or statistical-usage testing [3] , in which the longterm behavior of the product is observed and its reliability is estimated from the observations. Life testing is effected by operating the product as it would be operated in service. Inputs are supplied from an operational distribution, and outputs are consumed as they would be in a target environment. A single ''use'' of the product under such circumstances is usually referred to as a test, and the number of failures observed over an extended period can be used to provide an estimate of the failure rate per unit time. The number of observed failures is usually zero in the context of high-reliability systems, because in the event of failure, the responsible fault is isolated and repaired, and the assessment process is restarted. The estimate itself takes the form of a confidence interval. The reliability is assessed to be no worse than some specific bound with a certain confidence. The confidence level determines the probability that the reliability bound contains the true reliability.
The alternative to direct measurement is prediction. Prediction of the reliability of hardware systems is usually based on a model. Many models use Markov methods to analyze the effects of component failures (and possibly component repair) [ 121. The system's overall reliability is estimated by the model based on reliability data for the individual components. The data for individual components is obtained either by life testing or from models of the components themselves. This procedure is followed because it allows reasonable estimates to be computed much more quickly than would be possible with system-level life testing.
The Markov models for hardware require the assumption that component failures are independent, an assumption that is often appropriate for failures caused by physical degradation. Software failures, on the other hand, result from design faults rather than physical degradation, so the independence assumption is inappropriate. For this reason, software reliability has proved much harder to predict. Some progress has been made with reliability-growth models [IO] , but such models are of limited applicability because they depend upon other assumptions that are not always valid. Life testing at the system level is therefore attractive as an assessment technology, and has been advocated by many authors [3] , [9] , [ I I], Life testing of software has been criticized by Miller [7] , [8] and by Butler and Finelli [2] in a number of ways. Miller points out, for example, that it is difficult to ensure that the distribution from which the test cases are selected is identical to the operational distribution. He also observes that the lower the probability of failure that must be demonstrated, the more tests are required in the life testing procedure. The amount of testing required for assessing the reliability of safety-critical systems is, in general, infeasible. It might be possible to overcome such difficulties in some situations. For example, the large number of tests required might be executed in a 1131.
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In this paper, however, we examine a different problem with life testing of software. We refer to this difficulty as impefect error detection. Error detection is the process by which it is determined that a software system has failed. The analysis used in life testing to estimate the reliability of the software is based on knowledge of the outcome of some specified number of tests. The traditional analysis assumes the existence of an oracle, an observer of tests that can determine with absolute certainty whether the software operates correctly.
Weyuker [ 141 labels a program nontestable if no oracle exists for the program. She defines apseudo-oracle, which might be implemented by a separately written program designed to satisfy the same specification as the nontestable program, and discusses testing "nontestable" programs using a pseudooracle. A pseudo-oracle is subject to two types of errors. It may report a failure when the software is correct, or it may not report an actual failure. The former leads to a fruitless effort to find a nonexistent deficiency in the software, but has no bearing on the subsequent reliability analysis. The latter, however, goes unnoticed and leads to a reliability analysis based on incorrect data.
A premise of this paper is that most programs are "nontestable" by Weyuker's definition, and thus most error detection mechanisms are likely to exhibit pseudo-oracle behavior. In this paper, we use the term pseudo-oracle broadly to refer to any error detector that is not known to be perfect. Weyuker's paper identifies the qualitative result that pseudo-oracles may be unreliable; in this paper, we attempt to quantify the extent of the problem. We examine the effects of imperfect error detection and show how to compute realistic reliability bounds in the face of uncertainty about the quality of the pseudooracle.
In Section 11, we present a model for testing with imperfect error detection. We analyze the model for the case in which the quality of the pseudo-oracle is known in Section 111. Then, in Section IV, we extend the analysis to the more realistic case, in which the behavior of the pseudo-oracle is known only in a probabilistic sense. Finally, in Section V, we present our conclusions.
ERROR DETECTION
The goal of life testing is to estimate the reliability of a program P. The reliability parameter for which we will obtain a confidence interval is the failure probability of P , which we denote p . We observe P's behavior on inputs selected at random from an expected usage distribution, consult a pseudooracle to evaluate the output of P, and record the decision.
We need a measure of the quality of the pseudo-oracle in order to incorporate its effects into our reliability analysis. We define the hidden failure probability, denoted T , to be the conditional probability that the pseudo-oracle does not reject P's output, given that P has failed. The hidden failure probability reflects the inability of the pseudo-oracle to detect the failures of the particular implementation being tested; its In order to make our analysis tractable and to focus on the issues of greatest concem, we restrict our attention in two ways:
1) We assume that the pseudo-oracle is not repaired. In the event that failure does occur, the reliability assessment procedure can be started over after repair.
Because the hidden failure probability T reflects a relationship between the program and pseudo-oracle, T will be changed by the program repair. Both parameters p and r will have new values when the assessment process is restarted. The assessment procedure described above can be represented by the two-state Markov model shown in Fig. 1 . To be valid, the model requires that successive test inputs be selected independently, and that both the program and the pseudo-oracle be reinitialized to the same configuration at the start of each test run. In other words, the behavior of the program/pseudooracle pair on each test input is assumed to be independent of the pair's behavior on prior test inputs. For example, the assumption requires that when analyzing programs that retain state information from one execution to the next, each sequence of executions be treated as a single test input. Parnas et al. [ 1 1 1 discuss satisfying this assumption for a variety of different types of programs. The assumption above is quite reasonable for modeling purposes, and should not be confused with a very different and inappropriate assumption, which we explicitly do not make here, namely, that the program and pseudo-oracle fail independently.
The states in the Markov model represent the tester's knowledge about the existence of a fault in P. Life testing begins in the initial state, in which P contains no known flaws.
Recall that T , the hidden failure probability, measures the conditional probability that the pseudo-oracle fails, given that P has failed. Thus, the conditional probability that a failure will be reported, given that one has occurred, is 1 -T , and the unconditional probability that a failure will be observed is (1 -~) p . We move to the final state when a failure is observed; otherwise, with probability 1
we remain in the initial state. Entering the final state indicates that P contains a known fault that must be repaired. After repair, the reliability assessment process must be restarted in the initial state, with new values for both of the parameters p and r . We begin our analysis by considering the effects of a faulty pseudo-oracle on the number of tests that must be executed before the first failure is detected. We denote this number of tests by the random variable T . Each test case is a Bemoulli trial, with probability of detected failure (i.e., moving to the final state in Fig. 1 ) of (1 -r ) p . Examining the value of T in isolation does not reveal the extent to which its distribution is influenced by imperfect error detection. As a basis for comparison, therefore, we also analyze the behavior of an oracle, i.e., a perfect error detector. When an oracle is used, r is 0. We adopt the convention of marking measures on oraclebased testing with a tilde. Thus, for example, we define the random variable T to denote the number of test cases that are executed before the first failure is detected by an oracle.
T ' s distribution, like T's, is geometric. The probability that an oracle will reveal a failure on a single test case is just p, the probability that the failure will occur, and so the parameter of T ' s distribution is p .
Now consider the goal of the reliability assessment process. We wish to bound the failure probability of the program to a particular value with a given statistical level of confidence. For example, we may wish to ensure that the failure probability is less than or equal to with confidence 0.99. The interpretation of this statement is that if a large number of programs with actual (but unknown) failure probabilities greater than lo-' are evaluated, then, on average, less than 1% of them will be assessed to have failure probabilities less than or equal to lop4.
For any specific assessment, both the bound for p and the confidence level C are usually set by external requirements. The key issue that remains is to determine the number of successful tests required to show that the software system being assessed meets the prescribed bound with the required confidence. In general, we need to execute some number of tests, U , such that:
Recall that the distribution of the random variable T , the number of tests needed to reveal a failure, is geometric with parameter (1 -r ) p , so the number of tests needed depends upon both p and T .
To find the value of U that gives us the desired confidence interval, we solve the above equation by using the desired bound on the failure probability as the parameter p in the probability distribution for T , and the desired confidence level as the value of C. The equation means that if we execute U tests and the actual failure probability is p , we will observe one or more failures with probability C . Thus, the execution of U tests without observing a failure gives us confidence C that the actual failure probability is bounded by p.
Before we attempt to solve the above equation, we consider its counterpart for an oracle. The distribution for T is geometric with parameter p , so the probability that T assumes any specific value t is given by the following equation:
. t = l , 2 : . . .
Thus,
so the equation giving the number of tests U needed to give the desired confidence interval using an oracle is as follows:
We can solve this equation for U as follows:
Thus, if an oracle is available, this last formula is immediately useful for assessing P. The number of tests, U , that must be executed without observing a failure to give any desired bound on failure probability and confidence level can be computed by substituting the target values for p and C in the formula.
ANALYSIS FOR KNOWN HIDDEN FAILURE PROBABILITY
The analysis of the previous section was undertaken to permit a comparison of testing using pseudo-oracles, which are generally available, and testing using oracles, which are not available, but which are usually assumed to be available in most analysis of life testing results. In this section, we begin our analysis of testing using a pseudo-oracle. Initially, we assume that the hidden failure probability, T , is known. In the next section, we relax this assumption.
Recall that we want to calculate U , the number of successful tests needed to obtain the desired confidence interval. Also recall that T , like T, has a geometric distribution, but that the parameter of the distribution is (1 -r ) p rather _than p . The derivation of U , then, parallels the derivation of U , with each occurrence of p in the analysis of the previous section replaced by (1 -r ) p . The analysis yields the following expression for U :
U =
The above formula gives the number of tests that must be executed without an error report from the pseudo-oracle. The effects on U of changing the 'bound for p or the confidence level C are not immediately clear from this expression. These effects are very important in practice, not only in performing life testing analysis but also in setting the parameters to be used. Fig. 2 illustrates the influence of the failure probability bound and shows U as a function of r for three different values of the failure probability bound p , namely, p = lop3.
and lo-'. In Fig. 2 , the confidence level C is held constant at if achieving a bound of p requires U tests, then achieving a bound of p / 2 requires about 2U tests. In addition, reducing the visibility of the failure domain by a given factor has the effect of increasing the number of tests required by approximately the same factor to maintain the same bound on the probability of failure. Thus, if achieving a bound of p for a given 1 -T requires U tests, then achieving the same bound p for requires about 2U tests. The effect of changing the confidence level is addressed in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 also shows U as a function of T , but this time for three different values of the confidence level C, namely, C = 0.9,0.99, and 0.999. In Fig. 3 , the bound for p is held constant at the value and T is again varied from 0 to 1. The most striking observation from Fig. 3 is that a dramatic increase in the confidence level, C, results in only a small increase in the number of tests required, U . For example, increasing C from 0.9 to 0.999 requires increasing the number of tests, U , by less than one order of magnitude.
To isolate the effect of imperfect error detection on the necessary number of tests, consider the following ratio:
For typical applications, the values of p that we wish to obtain as a bound are small, i.e., near 0. Below we find an approximation for for small values of p . The approximation 
IJ
In has an approximate value of &. Thus, the factor by which the number of tests must be increased to compensate for the fallibility of the error detector depends almost entirely on the hidden failure ratio T .
In Fig. 4 , we show $, the factor by which the required number of tests increases, as a function of T , the probability that a failure will be hidden by the oracle. Although the exact value of E is a function of p , the approximation given above is excellent for the small values of p typically used in life testing. For example, the graph of $ with p = is indistinguishable from that of the approximation (&) at the resolution provided in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 reveals that the pseudo-oracle performs nearly as well as an oracle for even moderate values of T . As T approaches 1, however, the relative performance of the pseudo-oracle deteriorates rapidly.
Iv. ANALYSIS FOR UNKNOWN HIDDEN FAILURE PROBABILITY
If the specific value of the hidden failure probability were known for a given pseudo-oracle and program combination, it would be a simple matter to consult Fig. 4 to determine how many more tests to run to compensate for the imperfection of the pseudo-oracle. For example, if it were known that T = 0.8, then reliability evaluation with this pseudo-oracle would require about five times as many tests as with an oracle to achieve the same bound for the failure probability p with the same confidence C. If r were known to be 1, it would of course be impossible to obtain any reliability bound.
Unfortunately, the specific value of the parameter T for a particular system is not known at the time it is required for predictive purposes, i.e., during reliability assessment. Because the assessment process is restarted after program repair, we do not even leam more about T as assessment proceeds. The variability of 'r is likely to be large. It is reasonable to expect that many program/pseudo-oracle systems have values of T that are very low, and perhaps 0. Other systems will have quite large T values, however, and there is no known way to recognize these systems during reliability assessment.
Consider the value of T for some program/pseudo-oracle combination at the time the program is released for operational use. The reliability assessment process, completed prior to release, does not yield any information about T . Failure data about the program, collected after release, can be analyzed to estimate r , however. In other words, by collecting and analyzing failure data during operation, it is possible to estimate the value T had during reliability assessment. By using data collected for a large number of program/pseudo-oracle combinations, it is possible to estimate a distribution of r values for programs and pseudo-oracles in a given application domain. Below we show how to incorporate these data into a more realistic model of life testing, but first we discuss how to estimate I' from operational failure data.
When failure occurs during operation, one of two courses of action can be taken: 1) The failure is noted, but the software is not corrected; or 2 ) the corresponding fault is identified and corrected. The course of action taken determines the procedure for estimating r. In the case where the software is not corrected, the pseudo-oracle is executed on each input for which failure occurs to determine whether it would have detected the failure. The estimated value of T is the ratio of undetected failures to total failures.
In the more likely case that the software is corrected, somewhat more effort is required to estimate T . We can view each program fault as having an associated individual fault overlap ratio, the conditional probability that the pseudooracle will not detect failure, given that the particular fault causes failure to occur. The overlap ratio for the program is then the weighted average of the fault overlap ratios, where the weight for each fault is the probability that it causes failure, given that failure occurs. When a fault is identified and corrected during operation, it may be possible to estimate, through analysis of the program and pseudo-oracle, the overlap ratio of the identified fault. The weighted overlap ratios from identified faults form an estimate of T . Alternatively, the revised program can be instrumented to record inputs on which the original program would have caused failure, so that the value of T can be estimated directly, as in the case in which faults are not corrected.
An important factor influencing the distribution for T is the fault repair process. When a fault is detected and perfectly repaired, the program's overlap ratio decreases if the fault overlap ratio for the eliminated fault is greater than the previous average ratio. The more likely case, however, is that the discovered fault has a below-average overlap ratio because the pseudo-oracle does a better job of detecting such faults. In the limit, the value of r will approach 1, because all of the faults that the pseudo-oracle is capable of detecting will be observed and repaired. This suggests that frequent failures and repairs should be regarded as an indication that the software is not adequately reliable for assessment, and that the assessment process itself is being compromised. Much We can regard a particular program and pseudo-oracle combination as having been drawn from an appropriate population of program/pseudo-oracle pairs, with a known distribution of r values. The programlpseudo-oracle pair under assessment has associated with it a specific, but unknown, value of T . Below we present an analysis that incorporates information about the distribution of r in order to understand its effect on the associated population of programs. We take this approach because we can obtain information about population distributions, but not about the specific T value for a particular system. The probability that U tests reveal a failure of a program having failure probability p , given that the hidden failure probability is T , is as follows:
In other words, this quantity represents the conditional probability that U tests reveal a failure, given a particular value for r. What we want is the unconditional probability that U tests reveal a failure, given by the following equation:
where f i denotes the probability that T takes on the value ri; i.e., f is the probability distribution function (or the discrete approximation of the density function) for T . This probability distribution function can be used to derive a onesided confidence interval for T . In other words, f can be used to derive the number of tests, U , required to bound the probability of failure by p with a given confidence C. The confidence interval is defined by the following equation:
which yields the following, after some manipulation:
This formula is not as convenient to use as those derived earlier.
In particular, it is not possible to solve for U directly, although U can be found with a variety of standard numerical methods.
The value of U in any particular set of circumstances is the quantity of interest. Many elements of the equation are unknown, and insight into the meaningful values of U can best be obtained by sensitivity analysis. The effects on U of changing the bound for p or the confidence level C are not immediately obvious. Similarly, the sensitivity of the analysis to changes in various characteristics of the T distribution is difficult to determine. In order to address such questions, we consider some possible distributions for r. Although such an approach cannot completely determine the properties of arbitrary r distributions, the approach can guide an assessment of which characteristics are important in an r distribution. In Fig. 5 , we give two hypothetical distributions for T that are based on the following criteria.
1) The limited empirical data of which we are aware [I] indicates that the distribution for hidden failure probability has a shape in which a) most of the probability mass is near the value r = 0 and b) a small portion of the probability mass is near r = 1. Fig. 4 indicates that it makes a substantial difference whether r is near 1 or is exactly equal to 1. For low to moderate values of r, however, the curve for is nearly flat, so these parts of the T distribution are not likely to have much effect on life testing reliability analysis. Thus, the only difference between the hypothetical distributions is that distribution 1 has 1% of its mass at r = 1, and distribution 2 has 1% of its mass at r = 0.99. Fig. 6 shows how U and U vary for a range of values of the bound for p . Both hypothetical distributions for p are shown, and both parts of the figure were computed with a confidence level (C) of 0.989. Notice that U and U are both approximately inversely proportional to the bound for p . Recall that the hypothetical distributions for T differ from-r = 0 over only 1% of the r values. Nonetheless, U and U are quite distinct; there is a noticeable increase in the number of tests required to achieve a particular value of the bound for p.
)
The most striking aspect of Fig. 6 is that the graphs for the two hypothetical distributions are nearly identical. For the confidence level shown and for smaller confidence levels, the number of tests needed to achieve a given bound on p is not seriously affected by whether the worst pseudo-oracles have T values near 1 or exactly equal to 1. The confidence level used for Fig. 6 was deliberately chosen to be less than 0.99, however, for reasons that are explained below.
The impact of altering the confidence level C, by contrast, is dramatically different for the two hypothetical distributions. Fig. 7 compares the relationship between U and C with that between U and C. The comparison is done for each of the hypothetical T distributions and with the bound p = Fig. 7(a) compares U, U with C for T distribution 1, in which the probability that T = 1 is nonzero.
An important result of this analysis is that certain confidence levels are unobtainable. For example, notice that it is not = 1(1-4. possible to achieve a confidence level above C = 0.99 for the r distribution shown in Fig. 7(a) . The limit arises because, 1% of the time, r = 1, so the failure domain of the program is completely obscured. For these 1% of possible systems, testing is useless and establishes no bound on the probability of failure. Thus, no bound can be established with more than 99% confidence. Fig. 7 (b) compares U! U with C for T distribution 2, in which the probability that r = 1 is 0. In this case, any desired confidence level is achievable. As the figure shows, however, two orders of magnitude more tests might be required to establish the bound with a specific confidence level using a pseudo-oracle.
The analysis of the two hypothetical distributions reveals the following.
The number of test cases needed to achieve a given bound on the probability of failure is affected by the probability of a large value of r. Whether the value of r is equal to or just near 1 for this part of the T distribution, however, is relatively unimportant. The confidence level achievable for a particular r distribution is absolutely limited by 1 -prob(r = 1). The distribution of T values near 1 dramatically affects the number of test cases needed to achieve confidence levels near (1 -prob(r = l)), but any confidence level can be achieved if a sufficient number of tests are performed.
The part of the r distribution for which r = 1 has a substantial effect on life testing reliability analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
We maintain that error detection must always be viewed as potentially imperfect. When life testing is performed to estimate the reliability of a software system, the effect of imperfect error detection is to make the number of observed failures (which would usually be zero) an inaccurate measure. Failures might have occurred that went unnoticed. Such undetected failures mean that bounds on reliability computed by using the traditional life testing analysis can be incorrect to an arbitrarily large degree.
In this paper, we have shown how to incorporate information about the quality of a pseudo-oracle into life testing analysis. The parameter that measures the fallibility of a pseudo-oracle is the hidden failure probability T . The analysis incorporating a specific value of T into the life testing model is illuminating theoretically; but it is not of immediate practical interest, because the actual value of T for a given system is generally unknown.
Although the value of T for a particular program and pseudooracle is not available during testing, we think that it is reasonable for software developers to gather empirical data about T values by using failure data for operational software systems. Our analysis suggests that it is not essential to know all of the details of the distribution, because life testing reliability estimation is particularly sensitive to the portion of the distribution at or near 1. Certainly, a software reliability estimate based on an empirically estimated T distribution would be more realistic than one based on the assumption that T is always 0, as is implicit in traditional life testing analysis. At the very least, anyone who presents evidence supporting a particular reliability confidence interval should reveal and defend the assumed T distribution. The analysis presented in this paper can be used to make quantitative adjustments to reliability estimates if characteristics of the T distribution are broadly known.
The effect of incorporating uncertainty about the pseudooracle into the software assessment process is, of course, to increase the number of tests necessary to establish a given confidence interval. Somewhat surprisingly, our analysis shows that for highly reliable software and for achievable confidence levels, the number of tests necessary to support a given failure probability bound increases (approximately) linearly as the desired failure probability bound is made progressively more demanding, and that any bound can be established, given a sufficient number of tests. Our results show much stronger limits, however, with respect to the confidence level that can be placed in the bound on failure probability. The portion of the T distribution near 1 may cause a dramatic increase in the number of tests necessary to achieve a given confidence bound. Finally, the achievable confidence level is absolutely limited by the portion of the distribution that is exactly equal to 1. Thus, for the hypothesized T distributions, the confidence levels needed for critical software may be extremely difficult or impossible to achieve.
